Frequent lynching points to restiveness in society

LYNCHING of as many as six people in two incidents in a single day tends to indicate that the country continues to plunge into lawlessness belying the claim, made on more than one occasions, by the key functionaries of the Awami league-Jatiya Party government that the law and order situation is under control. According to a report published in New Age on Saturday, exasperated by repeated robberies without any remedy, the villagers at Kuruhata of Kapasia in Gazipur on Saturday night beat a group of 'strangers', suspecting them to be robbers, leaving four of them dead on the spot and five others critically wounded. Moreover, another suspected robber was beaten to death on April 6 by the mob in the same area. Meanwhile, according to another report published in New Age on the same day, two suspected robbers were beaten to death at Dharmapur village in Lakhai upazila of Habiganj early Saturday.

It is unlikely that people are unaware of the fact that beating anyone to death is a culpable offence. Yet, lynching is on the rise. According to the annual report of Odhikar, a human rights organisation, 174 people were beaten to death across the country in 2010, compared with 127 in 2009. Besides, as Odhikar says in its first quarterly report of 2011, 37 people were killed in mob violence around the country from January 1 to March 31.

The failure of the law enforcement agencies to stem unrelenting slide in law and order ever since the assumption of power by the Awami League-Jatiya Party government in January 2009, along with their continuous denial of the reality on the ground regarding law and order, may well have touched off a pervasive sense of insecurity among the people at large. It may also have led them to believe they are on their own when it comes to their safety and security. Meanwhile, the unabated extrajudicial killing by the law enforcers may have given rise to the impression in some sections of society that it is alright to take law in their hands or to execute summarily the alleged criminals.

The government needs to realise that the extrajudicial killing, be it by the law enforcers or by the angry mob, eventually undermines its self-professed commitment to the rule of law. Hence, it needs to be decisive in reining in crime on one hand and putting an end to all kinds of extrajudicial killings, including lynching, on the other.

Source: New Age

Reflections on women dev policy and IOJ’s hartal

Rahnuma Ahmed: APNADER naamte hobe, he said, after I'd mentioned the personal exigencies which led to my two-week absence from these pages. He's a good friend, a careful and discerning reader of what I write.

You [women] must enter the fray. He was shocked at the recent daylong countrywide shutdown called by the Islami Ain Bastobayon Committee (Committee for the Implementation of Islamic Law). And equally shocked at the response, or lack of, by women's organisations.

[But] I'm in the fray, I replied, chewing a morsel of chicken and rice. I was having lunch at New Age. As he nodded his assent somewhat distractedly, I debated whether I should remind him of the collection as well, which I had collated and translated several years ago, a task begun and accomplished when the BNP-Jamaat-e-Islami-led government was in power, when serial bomb blasts, blamed exclusively (the role of state intelligence agencies is still unclear) on Muslim radicals, killing dozens, maiming scores more, occurred over a period of several years, initially termed a 'media creation' by the-then government.

The volume, Islami Chintar Punorpothon: Shomokalin Musolman Buddhijibider Shangram, 2006 (Reinterpreting Islam: The Struggles of Contemporary Muslim Intellectuals) consisted largely of interviews, some essays and public lectures of contemporary philosophers and intellectual/activists, nearly all of whom are believing and practising Muslims. They debated issues and challenges facing them, ranging from imperialism to the notion of an Islamic state, modernity, terrorism, minority rights, the need to re-imagine the relationship between the creator and the created, (according to some) a need to re-imagine the creator Himself, the method of reading and interpreting the Qur'an, gender relations, hijab, polygamy, sexuality, homosexuality, rationality etc, etc. Despite differences among Islamicly oriented political parties and groups in Bangladesh, most vocal, and receiving the greatest media attention, were those who spoke of 'capturing the state'. That Muslims elsewhere debated a large array of issues seriously and critically was unknown to Bangla readers in print. I had considered it urgent to broaden the intellectual space within which debates over Islam and what it meant to be a Muslim are conducted, and because, as I would quip to friends, if Islam is now imperialism's battleground, surely, one must not make oneself absent from the field. Or we may end up lending our shoulders to imperial guns being fired in the cause of the war on terror.

Memories surfaced of my publisher's apprehensions prior to the publication which fortunately came to nought. The moment passed. I didn't mention it to my friend.

I had gone to New Age to tell Nurul Kabir, editor of this daily, that I had watched him on TV the night before, that his analysis of the politics of the policy, and of the April 4 hartal, was most illuminating. He had pointed out that Islami Oikya Jote leader Mufti Fazlul Haque Amini's allegation—the Awami League-Jatiya Party led government had gone 'against the Qur'an by adopting such a policy'—was false. That the government had back-pedalled, that the 1997 draft of the women development policy proposed by the-then Awami League government had stipulated that women should receive 'equal' shares, not half that received by her brother, whereas the policy, updated and finally passed by the cabinet last month, had been revised. It now says that a woman should 'exercise full control' over her earnings, inheritance, credit, land, and income derived from commerce. This particular phrasing, insisted Kabir, means that equal inheritance is no longer on the scorecard.

And yet the IOJ (actually, a faction, which also happens to be a component of the four-party opposition alliance) had opposed the policy (in addition to the High Court's ban on fatwas, and the National Education Policy) on the grounds that it gave women equal shares. Their banner reads, We reject inheritance law which changes Qur'anic devolution of shares (see photo). According to Islam, declared Amini, 'a woman can never be equal to a man.' While Sheikh Hasina was correct in pointing out that there was 'nothing in the women development policy that contradicted the Qur'an and Sunnah,' that Amini was 'misleading' the people, (New Age, April 4), the prime minister, said Kabir, had been reticent about the details.

The silence of women's organisations is deafening. It's because of a combination of several factors, he'd said. Larger women's organisations are allied to the Awami League. Their silence expresses their political subservience to the ruling party's interests, at the cost of sacrificing women's interests. In addition to this, the NGO-isation of women's organisations in the 1980s has meant that women's issues pursued are donor-driven and project-based. Funding is crucial, he said. Seeking funds is time-consuming.

It was a shame, insisted my friend and Kabir, over lunch. Why were women's organisations not out in the streets protesting against Amini's fabrication? How could they not rise up in protest at the AL government's betrayal given that they had struggled for 'equal shares' to inheritance for many years? Why did they not insist that equal shares be re-inserted into the policy? By lending its tacit support to the hartal, the BNP too, they asserted, was a party to the betrayal, as were women's organisations affiliated to the BNP. Khaleda Zia had cautioned the government to not attempt anything which would hurt the religious sentiments of the people. It could lead to chaos and anarchy, she said, while adding that the country had made significant progress in women's development.

It could be argued, said Kabir on TV, that the government stood to benefit from the hartal. Having incurred the displeasure of western governments at its recent treatment of the Grameen Bank's Dr Yunus, 'the blue-eyed boy of Washington', the hartal against the government's (purported?) position on equality for women would, in all likelihood, lends credence to Sheikh Hasina's pronouncements that she was a bulwark against Islamic militancy. Unlike her political opponents, i.e. the BNP-Jamaat government, which, Hasina said, had 'turned the country into a haven for terrorists and militants' during its rule (2001-2006). It would be music to western ears, it would enable her to curry favour back with western rulers.

It could also be argued, said Kabir, that the government was fully aware of the benefits of the hartal. Is it not strange, he asked, that a Dhaka court which had issued summons and arrest warrants against Amini on March 31—in two cases, one for defamation (Amini had threatened to 'pull down' the prime minister), the other for sedition (he had indirectly uttered a 'death threat' against the prime minister)—soon retracted both orders? According to press reports, the chief metropolitan magistrate said the magistrate had made a 'mistake' because he was 'new' to the job. The greenhorn was advised to lift both orders. He readily complied.

Being for, or against the Qur'an, is highly emotive. The bipartisan nature of political allegiances runs through the gamut of all institutions of the state and society, from the administration to the judiciary, the army, state intelligence agencies, and onwards, to universities, schools and colleges, trade unions, business associations, neighbourhood clubs, and so on. I find both party parochialism, and unproblematic understandings of modernity, secularism and religiosity, deeply perturbing as they foreclose a deeper understanding of history, both colonial and post-colonial. Of historical processes that were accompanied by forces of coercion and compulsion as well as instilling desires, that have made us what we are, and what we aspire to be. And unless one understands one's past, how can one dream and struggle for tangible futures?

It would be amiss of me if I were not to acknowledge that intolerance, at times, bordering on hysteria, which prevents us from conducting reasoned discussions, is partly due to the events of 1971 when Bengali collaborators had claimed to speak in the name of Islam, as had Pakistani rulers. To the events of 1975 and after, the killers of Sheikh Mujib had been rewarded, alleged war criminals had not only been politically reinstated, they had been installed as rulers, in 2001. These set of memories have been paralleled by bouts of amnesia among those who lay a monopolistic claim to 1971. Of forgetting that Sheikh Hasina had sought Golam Azam's blessings after 1991 elections; that AL stalwarts had a series of meetings with Jamaat leaders for a movement to force the BNP to insert the caretaker government provision in the constitution in the first half of 1990s; that the Awami League had entered into a pre-electoral deal with Khelafat Majlish in 2006. The rest of it, in my opinion, is due to intellectual laziness.

It is this that prevents us from re-examining our history, that leads those who claim to be the thinking sections of society (as opposed to those whom they view as being the illiterate masses, who need to be led and guided) to nurture commonsensical assumptions. Ones that feed off the binary dichotomy of religion versus secularism. For instance, it is unproblematically assumed that British rule was progressive for women because it led to increased secularisation, whereas the truth of the matter is that the process of Islamisation in the Indian subcontinent was initiated by the British colonial state when it gradually applied the principles of Islamic law. This meant that Muslims either decided, or were compelled by the courts, to order their lives and relationships, in accordance with the principles of that part of the sharia which westerners call 'family law', i.e. marriage, divorce, rules of inheritance, etc.

Another commonsensical assumption, deeper to British rule=secular, one that prevents us from critically examining the present too in our search for gender equality, is that secularism is neutral, it is devoid of relations of power. More specifically, of gendered relations of power. But that is not the case, and it is these issues that I will delve into, next week.

Pastor Jones and a dreaded ghost

MK Bhadrakumar:Broadly speaking, successful United Nations diplomats rise up the greasy pole at headquarters in Turtle Bay either by playing safe and allowing the good life to remain unruffled or alternatively, living dangerously. Staffan de Mistura, the Swedish-Italian who represents the UN secretary general in Afghanistan, belongs to the second category. His previous assignments included Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Lebanon and Iraq.

De Mistura's main qualification for the assignment in Kabul, however, was that he was very unlike the brilliant Norwegian diplomat whom he replaced, Kai Eide, who turned out to be 'a disappointment' (to borrow the description from a New York editorial) as far as Washington was concerned.

De Mistura—appointed just over a year ago—lacked a stellar international stature, but Washington wanted him in Kabul, given his previous working experience with both General David Petraeus, US commander in Afghanistan, and Karl Eikenberry, American ambassador in Kabul.

The late US special representative for AfPak, Richard Holbrooke, confided with The Cable, 'I [Holbrooke] had a very good talk with him [De Mistura], quite a long talk, we went over every aspect of the relationship. He wanted to discuss how he could relate to us ... I assured him that the US government and the US Embassy look forward to working with him ... De Mistura has the unanimous support of the US government.'

The above long-winded introduction becomes necessary for comprehending the alchemy of the explosive violence that shook the northern Afghanistan city of Mazar-i-Sharif last Friday afternoon that led to the killing of five Nepalese guards and three UN employees at the UN compound.

Accounts vary as to what happened. Following the Friday Prayer, a crowd that was leaving the famous Blue Mosque found another set of religious leaders in a Toyota Corolla fitted out with loudspeakers urging people to join them at the burning of the effigy of a militant fundamentalist Christian pastor in the US by name of Terry Jones who oversaw the burning of a copy of the Koran at his church in Gainesville, Florida, on March 20.

The crowd then turned and started walking the one-kilometre journey toward the UN compound. The Gurkhas who provided security for the UN were somehow overwhelmed and killed while a larger group apparently broke into the compound. In the violence that followed, all Afghan national staff and the Russian head of the UN office were spared, while the crowd went for Westerners, namely, three workers from Norway, Romania and Sweden.

What stands out is that the victims were deliberately murdered rather than killed by an out-of-control mob. Meanwhile, agitation against Jones has spread to Kandahar and the violence in Mazar-i-Sharif and Kandahar has somehow become coalesced, as if originating from one vast reservoir.

Afghan authorities and De Mistura have instinctively blamed the Taliban for the violence in Mazar-i-Sharif. The Taliban flatly rejected the imputation. Indeed, there are intriguing questions as to what really happened.

As the London Observer noted: 'If the glimmer of popular sympathy for violence in Mazar is disturbing, so too is the fact that such a terrible attack on Western civilians should have happened there at all. Mazar is a highly secure city of ordered streets, where cars are regulated by traffic lights, which, almost uniquely in Afghanistan, not only work but are obeyed. When Liam Fox, the [British] defence secretary, toured Afghanistan [in January], he made a point of adding Mazar to the usual British itinerary of Kabul and Helmand. "It was a totally unthreatening environment]," he said at the time. "It's a city the size of Bristol and it felt just like any safe city in Central Asia."... The newly opened US consulate, which has taken over an old hotel, does not even have a razor wire along its not particularly high walls.'

Indeed, anyone familiar with the Amu Darya region would know that the walk from the Blue Mosque to the UN compound itself is as eternal a walk as the footsteps that Neil Armstrong, the American astronaut, took on July 20, 1969, under the close monitoring of the Kennedy Space Centre at Cape Canaveral. Not a bird can fly across that one kilometre without the three lords of the northern Afghan manor noticing it (or permitting it to happen) — Rashid Dostum, Uzbek strongman; Mohammed Mohaqiq, Hazara Shi'ite leader; and Atta Mohammad Noor, currently governor of Balkh province and an erstwhile Northern Alliance leader.

Dostum, Mohaqiq and Atta might have had ups and downs in their mutual often-acrimonious equations, but one thing that unites them for a lifetime is their visceral hatred toward the Taliban and their existential fear of a return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan. They do not need to be told that the Taliban and them simply cannot co-exist within one Afghan political entity.

In sum, De Mistura has completely misjudged the signal from Friday's bloody violence in Mazar-i-Sharif. The city simply cannot have any Taliban presence. The weekend's violence in Mazar and Kandahar is of different kinds, although they are joined at the hip insofar as they are an explosive manifestation of a dangerous threshold of Afghan alienation with Westerners.

 

A ghost steps out from shadows

THE fact is that not only Dostum, Mohaqiq and Atta but the entire city of Mazar-i-Sharif—nay, the entire northern and western regions of Afghanistan—have taken stock that under a shroud of great secrecy, something of momentous consequence for their lives and that of their families and friends and ethnic compatriots may have commenced on March 28 at a faraway place—the Federal District Court on Constitution Avenue in Washington, DC—and they have no say in the matter.

The hearing has finally begun on a case concerning a former high-ranking Taliban official who has been held at the US detention facility at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba for the past eight years. His name happens to be Mullah Khairullah Khairkhwa.

The very mention of that name curdles the blood of any citizen of Mazar. There is a 14-year history behind it when mere anarchy was loosed upon the world, and indignant desert birds searched for carcasses to feed on in the ransacked city streets.

What Khairkhwa's name evokes is within living memory, a happening of 1997-1998. Briefly, to cut a horrendous story short, Khairkhwa was the chief of intelligence under Taliban leader Mullah Omar who headed the operations to capture Mazar in May 1997 through treachery in a trade-off (masterminded by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence with some of Dostum's renegade commanders. The attempt backfired and in the resistance that followed by the Hazara Shi'ites and Uzbeks, who form the bulk of the city's population, thousands of Taliban soldiers were butchered and the rout almost finished off the Taliban and Khairullah's future.

But then, the ISI didn't let misfortune overtake their favourite Taliban official and Khairkhwa regrouped and returned to first lay siege to Mazar and then bombard it for several months and thereafter storm it in August 1998. This time, Khairkhwa and the ISI took no chances. The Hazara Shi'ites were massacred in their thousands in revenge and for the next six days after entering Mazar, Khairkhwa ordered his men to go from door to door looking for male Hazara Shi'ites and summarily executed them.

Thousands of Uzbek prisoners were packed into transport truck containers to be suffocated or to die of heat stroke so that Khairkhwa could spare ammunition. Among those who managed to flee the city were Dostum, Mohaqiq and Atta. Mohaqiq was evacuated in the nick of time from Khairkhwa's clutches by a helicopter.

An Amnesty International report of September 3, 1998, chronicled unemotionally: 'Taliban guards deliberately and systematically killed thousands of Hazara civilians ... in their homes, in the streets where the bodies were left for several days, or in locations between Mazar-i-Sharif and Hairatan [on the Oxus River]. Many of those killed were civilians, including women, children and the elderly who were shot trying to flee the city.'

Every little child in Mazar knows the epic story of that bloodbath, which reached an historic scale the city had not seen since Genghis Khan and his Mongol army passed through in the 13th century. That is to say, nothing has been forgotten, nothing forgiven. And there is fury, anger, fear and frustration building up among the Uzbeks, Hazaras and Tajiks of northern Afghanistan that a Pashtun conspiracy is afoot in Kabul with the covert blessings of the 'international community' to rehabilitate Khairkhwa.

The case in the Washington federal court aims at getting an injunction that Khairkhwa's continued detention is 'unlawful' and that the US government should release him. Afghan President Hamid Karzai backs the move, while the stance of the Barack Obama administration remains extremely ambivalent, to say the least. Karzai said, 'If he [Khairkhwa] wants to talk, we welcome him. We would talk to him, we would arrange his release.'

Significantly, the US government allowed a delegation of the Afghan High Council for Peace (Karzai's nominees) to visit Guantanamo Bay in February to meet Khairkhwa. A spokeswoman of the American Embassy in Kabul said that 'the United States supports the work of the High Peace Council', but refrained from specifically commenting on Karzai's calls to release Khairkhwa. Karzai has suggested, on the other hand, that his government would be able to secure Khairkhwa's release. All indications point toward Kabul and Washington working in tandem.

The case is being steered ostensibly by a self-styled Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies based in Kabul and which has links with US and Pakistani intelligence and operates as a 'backchannel' between Karzai and US—and with the ISI—on the sensitive issue of reconciliation of the Taliban.

The centre's contention is that Khairkhwa's release 'will be influential to the peace process.' Its director, Hekmat Karzai, who is incidentally testifying as an 'expert' witness in favour of Khairkhwa's release during the hearing, has been quoted as brazenly estimating that 'Mr Khairkhwa is well respected amongst the Taliban and was considered a moderate by those who knew him. We believe he can help in creating the address for the Taliban that is needed in thus peace process.'

The CCPS director's contention is that the international community should 'incentivise' the Taliban to cajole them to dissociate from al-Qaeda, and measures such as making Khairkhwa a free bird on the Afghan political landscape are precisely the sort of bold, imaginative steps needed at this juncture to create an 'address' for the Taliban at the negotiating table. Hekmat Karzai recently asked in exasperation: 'But not enough has been done to build confidence for the Taliban to dissociate themselves from al-Qaeda. What do they leave all that for?'


Tread softly on dreaded memories

A VERY good question, indeed. Except that that is not how the non-Pashtuns see the state of play. First, the non-Pashtuns say that Afghan-American Pashtun activists from the diaspora who appeared on the Kabul scene in the downstream of the US invasion in 2001 have no clue to the current Afghan history and ground realities and are dangerously and cavalierly butting into sensitive domains of the Afghan ethnic problem, either out of sheer innocence or as playthings of quarters interested in the hardcore Taliban leadership's rehabilitation.

Indeed, a huge schism is developing in Afghanistan on the issue of the reconciliation of the Taliban, which could have profound consequences for the unity of the country. The violence in Mazar is a wake-up call that if pushed against the wall, non-Pashtuns will take recourse to violence and even take up arms if necessary to counter the return of the Taliban to Afghan political structures.

The opinion all over the Amu Darya region is hardening even as the Kabul government's efforts—with backing from Pakistan and an increasingly-war weary Obama administration—to reach out to the Taliban intensify. The non-Pashtun groups are peeved that Karzai no longer voices any direct criticism of Taliban atrocities against civilians. They scoff at the simplistic contention that the Taliban have changed their ideology and political agenda. They apprehend that if returned to power, the Taliban will prove as oppressive as before. Powerful voices in northern Afghanistan have begun to question Karzai's credentials and personal agenda of reconciling the Taliban.

From all appearances, De Mistura has missed the plot. He seems to blame the Taliban for the attack on the UN office. But Obama chose to speak philosophically: 'Now is a time to draw upon the common humanity that we share. The desecration of any holy text, including the Koran, is an act of extreme intolerance and bigotry. However, to attack and kill innocent people in response is outrageous.' Obama avoided making judgements as to why UN took the hit in Mazar.

For the Obama administration, a pot is boiling. The verdict by the Federal District Court in Washington will provide just the right fig-leaf to release Khairkhwa. Interestingly, Obama's predecessor in the White House, George W Bush, also seems to be keenly following what the Oval Office is up to. In an extraordinary public outburst on Friday, Bush posted a strong warning that the Obama strategy of reconciliation with the Taliban was going a bit too far, too fast. He said: 'My concern of course is that the United States gets weary of being in Afghanistan and says "It's not worth it, let's leave" ... We don't believe that's in the interest of the United States, or the world, to create a safe haven for terrorists and stand by and watch women's rights be abused. We've seen what it is like under the Taliban.

'Even though it was a decade ago, surely we can remember the fact that—for example—young girls couldn't go to school and women were jailed in their own homes. If they expressed themselves publicly in a way that irritated the Taliban, they were brutalised. That is not in our interests to see that kind of behaviour. We liberated Afghanistan from the Taliban ... I believed then and now we have an obligation to help this young democracy in Afghanistan survive — and thrive.'

The debatable point that Bush raised is as to how far the push to reintegrate hardcore Taliban leaders like Khairkhwa is justified. Probably, US intelligence has got through to Khairkhwa, as Hekmat Karzai's rosy remarks seem to suggest.

True, the Taliban's priority has always been to negotiate directly with the US. However, by making Khairkhwa a test case, the Obama administration is pushing the envelope. Another list of Taliban 'dignitaries' in Guantanamo Bay to be released is also on the consideration zone, including Abdul Haq Wasiq, former deputy head of Taliban intelligence, Mullah Morullah Noori, the Taliban's supremo for the entire northern Afghanistan region, and Mullah Mohammad Fazl, former Taliban army chief of staff.

Noori, Fazl and Khairkhwa—the trinity also figures in the UN's list of dangerous Taliban terrorists. Will the Obama administration get court injunctions for their release and then approach the UN for approval for removing them from the terrorism watch list, overruling objections from countries such as Russia, on the plea that the US judicial system does not allow their continued detention? It's all turning more and more into a farce. And the farce could turn overnight into a first-rate tragedy as the Mazar incident underscores.

The UN has had to take the brunt of the attack in Mazar because it is being seen as the convenient handmaiden of the Obama administration. And in the process, three Europeans have been killed although they had nothing to do with Khairkhwa's impending release from Guantanamo Bay.

Continued extrajudicial killings put a question mark on govt’s authority

THE assertion of the law minister, Shafique Ahmed, on Saturday that the government would take tough measures to stop extrajudicial killings by members of the law enforcement agencies is essentially of very little value. According to a report front-paged in New Age on Sunday, he said 'if any law enforcer kills a person without a valid ground of self-defence, it should be termed an extrajudicial killing and every allegation of such killings should investigated.' The condition, i.e. 'without a valid ground of self-defence', essentially negates the possibility of any investigation of extrajudicial killings by the Rapid Action Battalion and other law enforcement agencies. After all, key functionaries of the Awami League-Jatiya Party government, including the home minister and other members of the cabinet, have time and again sought to explain the trigger-happiness of some law enforcers as acts of 'self-defence'. Simply put, the pre-election promise of the ruling Awami League that 'extrajudicial killings will be stopped' and the foreign minister's assertion in the early days of the incumbent government's tenure that it would pursue 'zero-tolerance' policy against extrajudicial killings still remain within the realm of rhetoric.

Meanwhile, the law enforcement agencies, especially the Rapid Action Battalion, have continued with their extrajudicial actions. In fact, on Saturday, the very day the law minister reeled out his apparently ritualistic rhetoric, two young men, who had been picked up by members of the battalion on Tuesday and Wednesday, were admitted to Dhaka Medical College Hospital in 'critical condition'. According to another report also front-paged in New Age on Sunday, the two were allegedly tortured in custody. The incident took place amidst the widespread condemnation over the case of Limon Hossain, whose left leg had to be amputated after a member of the battalion shot him on March 23 after accusing him of being an accomplice of a 'terrorist' of Jhalakati.

The continued extrajudicial actions, including killing, by the battalion and other law enforcement agencies, despite condemnation and criticism by national and international human rights organisations at home and abroad and a series of rules by the apex court tend to highlight the sense of impunity that the law enforcers have. It also indicates that such a sense of impunity may have been reinforced further by the government's apparent failure to call them to account. The question that the government's apparent eagerness to justify extrajudicial killing with the clichéd self-defence argument leads rise to is: why is it unwilling to rein in the trigger-happy law enforcers? One may even ask if the government actually has any control over the trigger-happy law enforcers, especially those who belong to the Rapid Action Battalion.

Such questions are obviously detrimental to the government's authority and credibility. However, these questions will continue to haunt the people unless the government takes an unambiguous position against extrajudicial killing, instead of taking refuge in the pretext—as articulated by the prime minister on February 3—that extrajudicial killings cannot be stopped overnight. Indeed, extrajudicial killings have been in practice for long but it can be stopped and deterred; all the government needs to do is credibly investigate each and every incident of extrajudicial killing, prosecute the accused law enforcers and punish the guilty.

Source: New Age

Draft guideline likely to offer unfair advantage to Airtel

Mubin S Khan

The draft Cellular Mobile Telecommunication Operators Licence Renewal Guidelines 2011, prepared by the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission on behalf of the posts and telecommunications ministry, appears to hand over unfair market advantage to Airtel, an Indian telecommunications company and the latest operator to enter the market, telecom industry insiders say.

According to high officials in the industry, right from Airtel's acquisition of 70 per cent of the stake in Warid Telecom for $100,000 to allowing Airtel to exchange spectrum band access free of charge, the government and the commission have displayed a bias towards Airtel in their treatment of the telecom industry.

Four leading operators — Grameenphone, Orascom (Banglalink), Axiata (Robi) and Pacific Bangladesh Telecom Ltd (Citycell) — are up for licence renewal in November, after the expiry of the 15-year term of their licences, handed over in 1996.

According to the draft, operators will need to pay application fee, licence renewal fee, annual licence fee, revenue sharing, social

obligation fund as well as separate licence fees and charge for spectrum use.

The spectrum fees have been set at Tk 150 crore per MHz of GSM 1800MHz band frequency and Tk 300 crore per MHz of GSM 900MHz band to be multiplied with the utilisation factor of each of the operators.

In total, Grameenphone would have to pay Tk 5,504 crore, Banglalink Tk 2,994 crore, Robi Tk 3,000 crore and Citycell Tk 620 crore.

Top officials of the four leading operators say that the proposed fees are too high and do not reflect the true market value and will force the operators to increase prices for services, leaving Airtel, who acquired the licence in December 2005 for $50 million and are not up for renewal until 2020, a window of nine years in which it will be providing services for much lower rates.

'Outside of Grameenphone, the three other operators still operate on losses and, therefore, we do not understand the justification of this staggering fee,' says a top official of Banglalink.

'The fees set are more than a year worth of Grameenphone's revenue earning and higher than 10 years of Robi's earning and 15 years earning of Citycell,' says another top official of Grameenphone.

The official also points out that such high charges will significantly weaken the four operators' ability to pay for 3G licence, scheduled to be available by the middle of 2011.

Meanwhile, only in August 2010, Airtel exchanged 5MHz allotted from the 1800MHz band to 5MHz of 900MHz band without paying any fee, despite 900MHz band being worth twice in value, clearly indicating to a bias in the treatment of operators.

Officials of the top four operators also allege that the draft guideline also includes a number of regulatory conditions including obligation fund, mobile number portability, employment regulations and significant market power, all of which are beyond the scope of a licence renewal guideline.

'These conditions should apply to the whole industry and not just to operators seeking renewal,' says the top official of Banglalink.

Telecom industry insiders also allege that Airtel has been receiving preferential treatment ever since it acquired stake in Warid Telecom in January 2010.

'A number of our base transceiver station, or BTS, towers are running on generators most of the time while Airtel towers receive uninterrupted power supply,' says a top official in the telecom industry.

The official also said that Airtel's promotional offer of dinner with Indian actors Saif Ali Khan and Kareena Kapoor was against BTRC regulations, and on complaint from other mobile operators, all the BTRC did was issue a letter to all operators to not flout rules, foregoing any punitive action against Airtel.

Earlier, the parliamentary standing committee on the planning ministry in January described the acquisition of 70 per cent of the stake in Warid Telecom by Airtel as 'questionable', with indication of 'underhand deal', and asked the BTRC to conduct a full investigation in the matter to find out the loss in government revenue.

Airtel acquired stake in Warid for $100,000 whereas in 2008, Japanese operator NTT DoCoMo bought 30 per cent of the stake in Aktel (now Robi) for $350 million.

The BTRC chairman, Zia Ahmed, refuted all the allegations that the licence renewal fees are too high saying that they have been calculated based on the average revenue earning per subscriber of the four operators for 15 years.

'We are charging them 15 per cent of their future earnings based on their present market share, also taking into consideration that they did not pay any spectrum fees for the first 15 years and without calculating their potential for future growth,' Zia says.

'They are essentially charging us on potential future earnings,' says the top official of Grameenphone.

On the question of whether the telecom companies will be able to pay such high fees, especially since three of them are operating on losses, Zia says he doubts whether these companies are in fact incurring losses judging the size of their advertisement budgets. 'We will soon conduct audits on all the telecom companies.'

With regards to non-licence issues being included in the licence renewal guideline, Zia says that these are standard regulations for telecom industries around the world which had been missing in Bangladesh and the BTRC had taken the opportunity to include them in the draft.

With regards to Airtel, Zia says that when their time comes they will also have to pay the same charges. As for questions surrounding the acquisition of stake in Warid Telecom, Zia says, 'Warid was essentially a dying company and the low acquisition price has been offset by $300 million invested by Airtel into the company.'

Meanwhile, in a written response to queries of New Age, Airtel officials said that Airtel does not currently fall under the licence renewal process. 'Our company paid the requisite fees at the time of acquiring the licence and we would have to pay it again in future.'

With regards to the exchange of spectrum band frequency free of charge, Airtel said that despite paying the highest licence acquisition fee, Warid was only provided with 15MHz in 1800 band. 'These created an adverse effect for a level playing field in the industry. To ensure the level playing field for all operators, the BTRC allocated 5MHz Spectrum in EGSM band to Airtel in exchange of surrendering its 5MHz frequencies from its existing allocation,' reads the statement.

As for questions surrounding the acquisition of stake in Warid, Airtel responded that the transfer of the 70 per cent of the share from the Warid Telecom International Ltd has been transparent and in complete compliance with the government regulations where all due payments to authorities were cleared in time.

Source: New Age